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12.1  Introduction 
Whenever benefit-cost analysis is applied to evaluate policies intended 
to reduce the risks to life experienced by members of a community, the 
valuation of these risk changes is inevitable. This process has been a con- 
tinuing source of  controversy in areas with these types of policy-making 
responsibilities.  Indeed,  for nearly twenty years economists have been 
criticized on ethical grounds for attempting to “value human life.” While 
there is unlikely to  be an  end to this philosophical debate, it would appear 
that progress has been made in recognizing the importance of addressing 
explicitly these valuation decisions. This has been especially true for envi- 
ronmental policy, since William Ruckelshaus returned to EPA. Ruckel- 
shaus identified risk management as one of the most important issues fac- 
ing  environmental  policy-making.  In  discussing  before  the  National 
Academy of Sciences the difficulties associated with the current regula- 
tory process at EPA, he observed that 
Science and the law are thus partners at EPA, but uneasy partners. . . . 
The main reason for the uneasiness lies, I think, in the conflict between 
the way science really works and the public’s thirst for certitude that is 
written into EPA’s laws. . . .  EPA’s laws often assume, indeed demand, 
a certainty of protection greater than science can provide at the current 
state of knowledge. (Ruckelshaus 1983, pp. 3-4) 
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C. S. Gilbert is a senior research scientist at the General Motors Research Laboratories. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to consider whether economic methods 
are currently capable of responding to the demands likely to be posed by 
an approach to environmental regulation that focuses on the changes in 
risk resulting from more stringent standards for one or more dimensions 
of environmental quality. It is reasonable to expect that there will be a cor- 
responding demand for these risk changes to be valued. 
Several methods exist for measuring an individual’s valuations of non- 
marketed goods or services, including changes in risks.’ The specific focus 
of this chapter is on only one of  these methodologies-the  hedonic wage 
model. It has been the mainstay of most valuation estimates for the risk 
changes associated with life-threatening events, and plays an important 
role in the benefit estimates derived for the health effects associated with 
the primary national ambient air quality standards.2 
To conduct our appraisal of this framework, consideration will be given 
to the strengths and the limitations of the conceptual model underlying 
the hedonic approach and to the most detailed set of empirical estimates 
for a hedonic wage model currently available. Finally, this evaluation will 
be used to interpret the range of estimates currently available for valuing a 
“statistical life.” However, before turning to this evaluation, it is impor- 
tant to provide some perspective on what the policy-making needs are 
likely to be. Consequently, in section 12.2 we discuss the types of risk as- 
sessments that are a part of the standard-setting process for air pollutants, 
since they serve to define the nature of the valuation problems. 
Section 12.3 develops the conventional conceptual framework for the 
hedonic model, focusing particular attention on the assumptions impor- 
tant to the use of empirical model estimates of  an individual’s willingness 
to pay for risk reduction. 
Section 12.4 describes a detailed empirical analysis of real wages using 
the 1978 Current Population Survey, including both individual and site 
characteristics as determinants of wages, together with three types of risk 
variables: one of  the conventional measures of on-the-job accidents, an 
air quality index as a measure of the risk of potential chronic and acute 
health effects resulting from exposure to these pollutants, and an index of 
1.  A variety of taxonomic frameworks are used in describing these methods (see, for ex- 
ample, Schulze, d’Arge, and Brookshire 1981, Desvousges, Smith, and McGivney 1983). 
The indirect market methods rely on market transactions to infer an individual’s demand 
(and thereby willingness to pay) for a good or service. With nonmarketed goods, some link- 
age must be established between the marketed good and the nonmarketed commodity. This 
can be an a priori restriction to the utility function (as in weak complementarity), an assump- 
tion regarding how the marketed and nonmarketed goods are used in consumption (e.g., a 
restriction to the household production technology, see Bockstael and McConnell1983), or a 
technical linkage caused by the physical delivery system for the nonmarket good (i.e., air 
pollution is “delivered” in different doses to different geographic locations). 
The direct valuation methods rely on surveys to elicit individuals’ willingness to pay for 
hypothetical changes in one or more dimensions of  environmental quality. 
2.  See MathTech 1983 for the benefits analysis associated with the proposed new prima- 
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the prospects for exposure to carcinogenic substances in the workplace. 
Specific consideration is given to  the sensitivity of the valuation estimates 
to decisions that cannot be resolved on an a priori basis using economic 
theory. 
The last section summarizes the chapter and provides a prognosis for 
this method in valuing environmental risks. 
12.2  The Nature of  Policy Demands for Risk Valuation 
It is common practice among economists to assume that the primary is- 
sue in valuing the risk changes associated with air and water pollution 
control policies involves selecting a value for a statistical life.’ While there 
can be little doubt that this is an important component of these tasks, it is 
not the sole area where risk valuation is required. Indeed, this perspective 
can be misleading. It would seem to imply that estimates of individuals’ 
valuations for risks to life in other contexts (such as industrial accidents) 
can be readily transferred to the valuation of environmental risks. 
There is no a priori reason to accept this conclusion. Different types of 
activities that impose risks to an individual’s life may well lead to quite 
disparate willingness-to-pay values for risk reductions.  The correspon- 
dence between willingness-to-pay values across different types of  risk is 
the result of an assumption in the economic model used to describe indi- 
vidual behavior, not a conclusion drawn from empirical analysis. More- 
over, as we shall develop in the next section, analyses of individuals’ risk- 
taking decisions suggest quite different conclusions. 
A second reason for questioning this view  of  the valuation problem 
arises from the specific needs of environmental policy-making and the 
likely expansion in these needs under a regime of standard setting based 
on concepts of risk management. 
In order to  limit the scope of our summary of the policy-based needs for 
environmental  risk valuation, we  will  consider only air quality regula- 
tions. Under section 109 of the Clean Air Act, EPA is required to  establish 
ambient air quality standards for the criteria  pollutant^.^  This section 
mandates that primary standards be set at a level necessary to protect pub- 
lic health with an adequate margin of safety. Based on the act and its legis- 
lative history, EPA has interpreted this mandate in defining primary ambi- 
ent  air  quality standards  to be  based  on protecting  those  individuals 
established to be most sensitive to each criteria pollutant (though not nec- 
essarily the most sensitive members of the group) against adverse health 
effects (see Richmond 1981, and Jordan, Richmond, and McCurdy 1983). 
3.  An explicit example of these practices can be found in EPA’s guidelines for preparing 
the regulatory impact analyses required by Executive Order 12291. See especially US.  Envi- 
ronmental Protection Agency 1982, Appendix A, pp.  10-12. 
4.  See Richmond 1981 and Jordan, Richmond, and McCurdy 1983 for further discus- 
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In order to implement this approach, the activities associated with defin- 
ing a standard for each pollutant must: (a)  identify the types of health ef- 
fects likely to result from alternative ambient concentrations of the pollu- 
tant under evaluation; (b) specify the groups within the population most 
likely to be susceptible to these health effects; and (c) judge the changes in 
likelihood of these health effects that would accompany changes in the 
ambient concentration of the relevant pollutant. 
This process inevitably  leads to a fairly detailed  description  of  the 
health effects considered relevant to the standard-setting process. To illus- 
trate the nature of  these effects, we have considered a recent analysis of 
four criteria pollutants-carbon  monoxide,  sulfur dioxide,  particulate 
matter, and lead. Table 12.1 describes the types of health effects consid- 
ered in each case.5 Three aspects of these risks are important from a valu- 
ation perspective. 
The first arises in the definition of the group used to value statistical 
lives. A statistical life is an alternative measure of risk reduction.  It is 
based on an  ex ante welfare criterion and envisions the decision process as 
follows (see Hammond 1981 and Ulph 1982). The decision maker is con- 
fronted with a policy that will reduce the risk for a group of individuals by 
a certain amount, say AK Since this risk reduction is experienced equally 
by all individuals it is a type of public good. A common approach for re- 
porting the valuations of risk reductions has been to form an aggregate by 
asking how large the group would need to be in order for the change of Ar 
to lead to a reduction of one in the expected number of deaths for the 
group (i.e., N = l/Ar). If we have estimates of the willingness to pay for 
Ar  for each member of the group, then their valuation of the risk change 
can be considered their collective willingness to pay (AWTP)  for a statisti- 
cal life (i.e., AWTP = C wi(Ar), where wi(.)  is the ith individual’s willing- 
ness to pay for risk reductions). This has been a common format used in 
reporting the valuations of risk reductions. 
However, in interpreting these estimates it is important to recognize 
that the risks described in table 12.1 are not experienced by all members of 
society. Rather they are usually associated with specific groups (Le., the 
sensitive members of the population). These groups will not, in general, 
correspond to the groups used in estimating (with hedonic wage models) 
the “representative” individual’s willingness to pay for risk reductions.6 
5. These health effects are not intended to provide an exhaustive summary of those iden- 
tified in the criteria document for each pollutant. Rather, they are indicative of the level of 
detail required in specifying both the nature of the effects at risk. 
6.  See Smith 1979, Blomquist 1979, and Violette and Chestnut 1983 for reviews of the 
literature  estimating the value of risk reductions using wage models. These analyses are con- 
fined to groups with available wage surveys and often to subsets of employed individuals in- 
volved in more hazardous work. This was the case for one  of the first studies in the area by 
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Table 12.1  Selected Criteria Pollutants and Health Effects at Risk 
Pollutant  Health Effect  Threat to Life 
Carbon monoxide’  aggravation of Anginab  no 
no  aggravation of peripheral vascular disease 
myocardial infarction  yes 
effects on fetuses (increases. in late fetal  yes 
and early neonatal mortality rates) 
Sulphur dioxidec  aggravation of asthma  no 
aggravation of emphysema  no (?) 
aggravation of chronic bronchitis  no 
aggravation of heart disease  yes 
aggravation of other forms of lung disease 
aggravation of chronic respiratory disease 
aggravation of heart disease  yes 
yes (9 
Yes 
Particulate matterd  aggravation of acute respiratory disease  no 
Leade  impacts on  the nervous system 
IQ detriment in children 
impacts on  the circulatory system 
increased risks in childbirth 
aggravation of anemia 
Notes:  The judgments as to the threat to life resulting from the health effect are inter- 
pretations of discussions in the risk assessments used to develop this table. They are 
intended to convey an appraisal of whether the health effect noted would be the primary 
cause of death. 
‘The  sources of this summary of  health effects were Keeney et al.  1982, and Smith, 
McNomee, and Merkhofer, n.d. 
bSome questions have been raised recently with respect to the statistical analysis un- 
dertaken to establish this effect. Therefore, it should be regarded as a potential impact 
but not as clearly established as the others. 
‘The health effects were not drawn directly from a risk assessment for sulphur dioxide. 
Rather they were taken from Merkhofer’s 1981 summary of the principles involved in 
conducting such assessments. 
dThese  health effects were  not  as specifically defined because the criteria document 
focused on  epidemological studies rather than clinical studies in defining the health risks. 
See MathTech 1983, vol. 2 for more details. 
‘These  health effects  are based  on the preliminary work currently  underway  in the 
development of a primary standard for lead and are based on  private correspondence 
with Allen Basala, Chief Methods Development Section, OAQPS, U.S. Environmental 
hotection Agency. 
To the extent that members of these groups have specific characteristics 
that affect their performance in the labor market, we  can expect differ- 
ences between their  “true” AWTP and that estimated using the results 
from conventional hedonic wage models. 
A second issue arises with the type of events at risk. They are different 
from those providing the risk estimates in the hedonic wage models. The 
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immediate physical consequences including physical impairment and, in 
some cases, fatalities. These differences are important because a growing 
body of research suggests that attributes of the events at risk and the risks 
themselves affect individuals’ valuations of risk.’ Violette and Chestnut 
(1983) in their recent summary of the relevance of these findings to the 
economic methods for valuing statistical lives noted that 
The evidence accumulated by the studies that have researched this topic 
indicates that society may place different values on different types of 
risks . . .  it may be the case that individuals value the flexibility associ- 
ated with the acceptance of voluntary risks. Voluntary risks are usually 
associated with activities that could be discontinued in the future if the 
individual’s risk preference structure were to change. This is not the 
case with many involuntary risks. (Violette and Chestnut 1983, pp.  5- 
18 to 5-19) 
Equally important,  the character and quality  of  an individual’s life 
(Zeckhauser and Shepard 1976) are clearly affected by the types of health 
effects leading to fatalities. 
Finally, many of the risk changes involve health effects that do not rep- 
resent immediate (or indeed any) threats to life. They are changes in the 
likelihood of either chronic or acute health effects. While a willingness-to- 
pay criterion would also offer the most appropriate basis for valuing these 
risk changes, there has been no empirical basis for developing these esti- 
mates.8 
Thus, the policy demands for risk valuation require more detailed and 
discriminating estimates of individuals’ willingness to pay, accounting for 
both the nature of the health effects and the character of the risk than is 
generally available with hedonic models. Of course, it should also be ac- 
knowledged that these limitations are largely the result of  the constraints 
imposed by the available information used in constructing these models. 
Consequently, it seems reasonable to consider the behavioral assumptions 
made in describing individual actions that function as a “partial” substi- 
tute for the more discriminating information. A risk management policy 
may well require transferring the available risk valuation estimates based 
on experience within the workplace to a wider range of environmental 
risks. An examination of the implications of these assumptions should 
7. See Violette and Chestnut 1983 for a review of the research in this area that is most di- 
rectly related to the economic estimates  of the value of risk. Other related work in psychology  is 
discussed in Fischhoff et al. 1981, chap. 5. 
8. See Freeman’s 1979 summary of practices  in this area. Several authors have attempted 
to distinguish separate effects for the risks of fatal and nonfatal accidents. Olson 1981 is one 
notable example. However, this practice is also imperfect because of the heterogeneity in the 
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also provide some basis for judging the desirability of these transfers of 
the willingness-to-pay estimates. 
12.3  The Application of Hedonic Models to Represent 
Risk-Taking Decisions 
The application of the hedonic framework to  explain transactions in la- 
bor markets has been described as a formal statement of  the theory of 
equalizing differences (see Thaler and Rosen 1975; Smith 1979). Hedonic 
wage functions are thus considered to be equilibrium relationships, repre- 
senting a double envelope-the  lower boundary of the individual worker’s 
wage acceptance functions and the upper frontier of firms’ wage offer 
 function^.^  Consequently, the specifications necessarily reflect both the 
demand and supply determinants of these tied transactions in labor mar- 
kets. By  maintaining that these functions describe the market equilibri- 
um, it is possible to use them to estimate the representative individual’s 
marginal willingness to pay for any attribute (or component) of the tied 
transaction. This conclusion follows from the nature of the equilibrium it- 
self. Under ideal conditions, if the contribution made to the market-clear- 
ing price by an increment to any attribute was not simultaneously equal to 
the marginal willingness to pay and offer price for that attribute, then 
there would be scope for arbitrage behavior. 
When this framework is applied to the analysis of job risks, these risks 
are treated in simplified terms. The events at risk are assumed identical and 
capable of being fully described by the probability of a homogeneous ac- 
cident. Consequently, risk becomes similar to any other job attribute. To 
appreciate  the implications of this framework, we need to consider, in specif- 
ic terms, the model of individual behavior used to  describe such choices. 
Assume an individual seeks to maximize expected utility defined in 
terms of Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over the states of 
nature. Each state has implications for the income stream an individual 
can expect to realize and therefore for the goods and services that can be 
consumed. The individual will be assumed to be risk averse (i.e., the util- 
ity function p(x, y), is concave in x and y). For our purposes we maintain 
that there are two states-either  the individual incurs an accident or he 
does not incur an accident. The accident is defined as equivalent to an in- 
come loss of L. An individual obtains income by working and can select 
jobs that deliver wages and some probability, r, of an accident. He also se- 
lects commodities x and  y. 
9.  See Rosen 1974 for a general discussion of the hedonic framework and Thaler and Rosen 
1975 for a derivation of the framework with job risks. Triplett 1983 has recently provided an 
overview of  this literature, appraising the implications of  recent theoretical developments 
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In this framework the individual’s objective function can be written as 
equation (1): 
where  P;  = price of commodity i  (i = x, y); 
R  = probability of state involving loss of L  (in this example 
w(.) = wage function describing equilibrium locus of wages 
R = r); 
and risks, r. 
If we assume that the individual cannot change jobs and, in the process, 
control the level of  risk experienced (i.e., r is not a choice variable), then 
risk of the loss, L,  is a given to the decision process. Under these circum- 
stances the individual’s marginal willingness to pay (MWTP)  for risk re- 
duction is given by equation (2). 
p* - -  (2)  MWTP = PxMRSrx = Px  c1 
rpx + (1 -  r)d ’ 
p?, pi  = first derivative of p*, jZ with respect to i. 
Since equation (2) defines the individual’s inverse demand for risk reduc- 
tion, it provides the accepted economic basis for valuing changes in risk. 
Once we acknowledge an individual’s ability to select a job and assume 
that those selections are based on the wage-job risk combinations avail- 
able in the market, then the model must be adapted. If we assume, in addi- 
tion, that an individual correctly perceives job risks (so that R = r),  then 
there is some basis for using behavioral actions to estimate an individual’s 
valuation of  risk changes. That is, the existence of  w(.)  allows us to ob- 
serve one point on this inverse demand function corresponding to the in- 
dividual’s equilibrium selection of the terms of work. The first-order con- 
ditions for a maximum of equation (1) with r a choice variable imply that 
Px  x MRS, will equal the slope of the hedonic wage function at the equi- 
librium selection of r, as given in equation (3). 
(3) 367  Valuation of Environmental Risks Using Hedonic Wage Models 
This framework can be  seen as an adaptation to that  presented by 
Thaler and Rosen (1975) (see also Freeman 1979). 
Nonetheless, several points are worthy of specific attention. First, the 
loss, L,  is  assumed capable of being expressed in monetary terms.  As 
Thaler and Rosen observed, this simplification implies that if individuals 
can insure against the loss at actuarially fair rates, then this specification 
would imply an  equalization of incomes between the two states. 
To the extent we believe that the events at risk do not readily translate 
into monetary terms, then the utility function for the loss state may in- 
clude a reduction in income, L (and the corresponding  decreased con- 
sumption of x and y), as well as changes in other variables that are as- 
sumed to  be associated with characteristics of the loss state, which are not 
purchased in markets but are “delivered” with the events at risk. These 
variables might reflect the nonmonetary dimensions of the events at risk. 
This case can be treated as implying state-dependent  utility functions. 
With this specification the equalization of marginal utilities under fair in- 
surance would not imply equal incomes.1o  Indeed, in such cases even with 
fair insurance an individual will nonetheless prefer one of the states over 
another (see Cook  and Graham 1977). 
These two assumptions (i.e.,  state dependency of the utility function 
and existence of fair markets for diversifying risk) have direct implica- 
tions for the interpretation of the hedonic wage model. For example, if we 
assume that there are fair insurance and state-independent utility func- 
tions, then we can write dw/dr  in terms of the loss experienced, as in equa- 
tion (4)  below.’I 
(4)  dw  -  = L. 
dr 
By contrast with state-dependent utility functions, or an absence of actu- 
arial fair insurance, the form of dw/dr  is altered as given for the former in 
equation (5). 
10.  This conclusion follows because the utility functions for each state are assumed to be 
different. Consequently, the income certainty and utility certainty loci will be distinct and 
also different from locus of equilibrium choices in a contingent claims framework. 
11.  This result can be established by respecifying the objective function as: 
where I = level of insurance. Differentiating with respect to the selection of Iyields equality 
of the marginal utilities for  x in both states. Consequently the income levels assigned to each 
state  will be equal and I -  L must equal -  (r/l -  r)  I. Thus I = (1 -  r)  L. Given this result, 
the specification of the utility function implies equal marginal utilities with respect toy. 
where ,Li  = total utility in no  accident state and F = total utility in accident state. However, 
equal income implies p -  p = 0. Substituting for I  we have equation (4). 368  V. Kerry Smith/Carol C. S. Gilbert 
--  dw  -  L + Px ( y  ), 
dr 
where fi = the total utility without the accident and  fi = the total utility 
with the accident. The existence of fair markets for insurance implies that 
b  =bx. 
Equation (5)  implies that transferring the estimates of individuals’ will- 
ingness to pay for risk reduction for one type of  risk to the valuation of 
the incremental changes in another type of risk may not be possible. That 
is, even if the monetary losses at risk are identical, the nonmonetary may 
well be different, and therefore we can expect differences in the magni- 
tude of (ii -  fi). 
Thus, examining the behavior of a set of individuals facing one type of 
risk and using their behavioral responses to develop estimates of the same 
individuals’ valuation of another type of  risk will lead to incorrect esti- 
mates of the values of the risk change. The same conclusion can be drawn 
if there are differences in the extent to which individuals can diversify ac- 
tivities and reduce the impacts of each type of risk. In this case, dw/dr for 
the risks facing one individual would reflect that individual’s risk distribu- 
tion of income, which may not characterize the opportunities available to 
a second individual.’* 
It may be more reasonable to assume that the same individual faces 
risks from different activities and can select the risk level in each by either 
changing jobs or altering the mix of his activities. The conventional as- 
sumption for these models is to maintain that these risks lead to  the same 
outcome (see Freeman 1979 as an example). The risk of death from any 
source has the same valuation. It is this assumption (i.e., R in equation (1) 
is  simply  C rj, where  n =  the alternative mutually exclusive ways in 
which an individual might experience risks of fatalities) that assures that 
the marginal valuations of the alternative risks correspond. ’  However, if 
12.  See Cook and Graham 1977 for further discussion of  this concept of inefficiency in 
13.  In this case the objective function could be rewritten as 
R 
j=  1 
the risk distribution of income. 
w(r) -  Pyy(s) -  L + Z 
px 
EU = (r + s)p 
wheres = risk associated with consumption activity that is selected by the intensity of under- 
taking y (hence y is a function of  s).  Differentiating with respect to s we have a general ex- 
pression for dy/ds  that suggests the marginal valuations of risk are equated after adjustment 
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it is believed that the attributes of the events at risk are important to an in- 
dividual’s evaluation, then the model must be amended to include new 
states and corresponding distinct utility functions for each. These amend- 
ments imply that the transfer of marginal valuations estimated from deci- 
sions on one type of risk to  those of another type would not be warranted. 
It seems reasonable,  therefore, to consider the nature of the evidence 
available for differences in how individuals respond to different types of 
risk. 
As we noted earlier Violette and Chestnut (1983) used this literature in 
their review of the available estimates of the willingness to pay for risk re- 
ductions. Clearly one can use the differences in risk valuations between 
workplace (i.e., hedonic wage) and consumer market studies to provide 
informal evidence that individuals value different types of risk different- 
ly.“  In 1982 dollars, the range of estimates for the values of a statistical 
life derived from the consumer market studies was confined to the lower 
end of  the valuations from wage hedonic models based on workplace 
risks.I5 Of course, it should be acknowledged that each type of study is 
subject to many assumptions that might also account for this discrepancy. 
Nonetheless, when considered together with the policy and psychological 
analyses of risk-taking behavior, this interpretation cannot be dismissed 
as irrelevant. 
The policy analyses of risk-taking behavior begin with the assumption 
that individual (and indeed social) preferences toward risk are revealed 
through individuals’ behavior in accepting different types of risk. Starr 
(1969) appears to have been the first to use this framework to compare 
risks in an effort to identify the characteristics of risks that influence indi- 
viduals’ willingness to accept them. All of the studies in this area have 
been crude in their methodologies and should therefore be regarded as 
suggestive of the important characteristics of risk. Nonetheless, the char- 
acteristics identified by the most recent of these studies of Litai (1980) 
conform in several respects with the features found to affect the perfor- 
mance of the expected utility model in experimental tests (see Hershey, 
Kunreuther, and Schoemaker 1982). They include: volition, severity, ori- 
gin, effect manifestation, exposure pattern,  controllability, familiarity, 
benefit, and necessity. 
Both sets of research seem to suggest that a state-dependent framework 
that recognizes the influence of the attributes of risk may be necessary for 
modeling individuals’ responses to different types of risk. Furthermore, 
this would imply that valuation estimates derived for risks in one context 
may not be relevant to comparable risk reductions in another setting. 
14.  The consumer market studies are more limited and refer to such decisions as wearing 
15.  These estimates were quite close to Portney’s 1981 implicit valuations of risk derived 
seatbelts or purchasing smoke detectors. See Violette and Chestnut 1983 for a review. 
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Unfortunately, it is not possible to directly investigate this issue. Data 
limitations prevent specific consideration of how individuals’ value dif- 
ferent types of risks. It is, however, possible to consider the sources of 
some of these risks (e.g.,  exposure to air pollution and to carcinogenic 
materials) in a hedonic wage model and to consider how robust the model 
and its estimates of willingness to  pay for risk reductions in the workplace 
are to the role of these environmental variables in the model. 
12.4  Estimates of a Hedonie Wage Model and the Valuation of Risk 
Our reviews both of the policy requirements for estimates of individ- 
uals’ valuation of risk reductions and of the theoretical basis for valuing 
risk changes endorse the need for distinguishing different types of risks. 
From the perspective of environmental policy (especially air pollution 
policies), such distinctions are important because they arise from the na- 
ture of the effects of different pollutants. The theoretical analysis also fo- 
cuses on these differing effects, but emphasizes the possibility that indi- 
viduals might value them  differently. Consequently, even though two 
different activities might yield the same risk to life, an individual may well 
value reductions in the risk posed by one of these activities more highly 
than the other. 
In order to evaluate the practical significance of these policy needs and 
theoretical arguments, empirical estimates of the willingness to pay for 
risk reductions across a range of activities are needed. Moreover, these es- 
timates must be derived from a consistent description of individual behav- 
ior if they are to be compared in a meaningful way. As we noted earlier, 
the present analysis will fall short of this goal. Data limitations remain the 
primary culprit. While the analysis that can be undertaken is more limited, it 
is, nonetheless, suggestive of the importance of refining our empirical 
models for estimating individuals’ valuation of risk. 
Our empirical analysis will consider two aspects of hedonic wage mod- 
els. First, using a detailed wage model developed with microdata, we 
estimate  individuals’ willingness to pay  for two  types of  risks-life- 
threatening accidents in the workplace and risks of death through expo- 
sure to air pollutants (i.e., total suspended particulates). Our results indi- 
cate under  reasonable assumptions that these two sources imply quite 
different implicit valuations for comparable risk changes. 
The second aspect of our empirical analysis considers the variation in 
estimates of these marginal valuations that would arise from plausible 
variations in the specification of the hedonic wage model. The objective 
of this appraisal is to gauge whether the discrepancy in the estimates of the 
marginal valuation of different types of risk reductions would be attributed 
to the imprecision of the hedonic model. 371  Valuation of Environmental Risks Using Hedonic Wage Models 
12.4.1  The Basic Model 
Since the hedonic wage function is an equilibrium relationship,  the 
model should include both demand and supply determinants of wage 
rates. Moreover, to the extent that the sample used in estimating this rela- 
tionship includes individual wage rates in different geographic locations, 
we  can expect that the equilibrium locus will reflect the marginal valu- 
ations of site amenities (see Rosen 1979). Equation (6) provides a general 
statement for the hedonic wage function. 
with ~i a stochastic error. This specification maintains that the real wage 
rate (i.e., the nominal wage w  divided by a cost-of-living  index, P, for indi- 
vidual 0 will be a function of individual characteristics (XI,),  job character- 
istics (xJ,), and geographic site characteristics (xs,). 
Past hedonic models have tended to focus on a subset of these vari- 
ables, with those arising from the wage differential literature emphasizing 
xIandxJ(see  Brown 1980, Lucas 1977, Thaler and Rosen 1975, and Viscusi 
1978a as examples), while those from the environmental and urban appli- 
cations focusing onx, and xs (see Hoch 1974, Cropper and Arriaga-Salinas 
1980, and Rosen 1979 as examples). In order to avoid the possibility of 
specification  errors, all three sets of variables must be included. 
To meet this objective requires a merging of the information from con- 
ventional wage surveys with data on job and site characteristics. This task 
was undertaken using the individuals living in each of forty-four Standard 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) for the May 1978 Current Popu- 
lation Survey. This locational attribute permitted the assignment of site 
characteristics to each sample respondent. In addition the available infor- 
mation on individuals’ characteristics, including socioeconomic attributes, 
occupation, and industry, permitted the assignment of job characteristics. 
Since the specific details of these assignments are discussed in Smith 
(1 983), we will turn to a description of the variables included in the specifi- 
cation of the basic model used for the estimation of the marginal values 
for risk reductions from different sources. The sample after these assign- 
ments consisted of 16,199 observations.16 
A wide array of variables describing site characteristics were consid- 
ered. The final set of variables used in the model included: a crime rate 
measure (i.e.,  serious crimes per  100,OOO  inhabitants of the SMSA in 
1975), CRIME;  the average unemployment rate for the SMSA in 1978, 
UN78;  the mean annual percentage of possible sunshine, SUN;  and an air 
16.  For the specific details on the treatment of missing observations, consideration of al- 
ternative specifications and samples, and discussion of the implications of the selectivity bias 
for the model’s results, see Smith 1983. 372  V.  Kerry SmithKarol C. S. Gilbert 
quality index, TSP (i.e., total suspended particulate matter in micrograms 
per cubic meter, measured as the annual geometric mean at sites with com- 
plete data).” 
The job characteristics were confined to four variables that could be as- 
signed based on translating the census identification of industries to the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). They were as follows: the BLS 
occupational injury rate for 1975, ACCZDENTRATE; an index of expo- 
sures to  carcinogens in the workplace,ls CANCER; a measure of workers’ 
knowledge of job hazards (defined as the number of workers in each in- 
dustry covered by  collective bargaining agreements with general provi- 
sions concerned with health and safety conditions relative to the total em- 
ployment in that industry), KNOW; and a measure of the degree of price 
uncertainty in the product market for each industry, 0JTIg  Based on ear- 
lier theoretical research (Le., Holtmann and Smith 1977, 1979), it was hy- 
pothesized  that  uncertain  product  market  conditions would affect the 
availability of on-the-job training. 
Finally, the individual characteristics provide the most extensive set of 
variables, including most of the factors mentioned in earlier studies of the 
determinants of wage rates including: education, EDU; experience (mea- 
sured  as  age  minus  years  of  education  minus  six),  POTEXP;  race 
(white = 1); sex (male = 1); veteran status, VET (veteran = 1, and relevant 
only for males); union member (union = 1); head of household (head = l), 
dual-job holder (if dual-job holder variable = 1); and qualitative variables 
for occupations (see table 12.2 for the specifics). 
The wage rate measure was calculated as usual weekly earnings divided 
by usual hours worked. The local cost-of-living index was based on the 
1977  BLS cost-of-living  index  for an intermediate budget  (see Smith 
1983). 
The first columns in tables  12.2 and  12.3 report the ordinary least- 
squares estimates for the basic model with the full sample and a subsample 
composed only of males respectively. A semilog specification (with the log 
of real wages as the dependent variable) was used for these results. The 
overall estimates of the effects of  individual characteristics are compara- 
ble to earlier studies. The site and job characteristics are also generally 
consistent with those earlier studies which included subsets of the set of 
variables included in this specification. Consequently, either model (i.e., 
that based on the full sample or that derived using only males) would be 
17.  A variety of  other pollution measures were also considered. However, the measures 
are closely intercorrelated, suggesting that precise estimates for each one’s effect on wages 
will be difficult to realize. 
18.  For more details and caveats with respect to these exposure estimates see Hickey and 
Kearney 1977. 
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'hble 12.2  Hedonic Wage Models: Full Sample with Alternative 
Environmental Quality Measures 
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Table 12.2 (continued) 
EQ  EQ  EQ 
Variable  Basic Model  A  B  C 
Union member  .183 
(22.32) 
OJPPOTEXP  -  .0012 
( -  0.98) 
CRIMEb  .094 
(4.60) 
SUN  -  .0015 
(- 2.62) 
Dual job  -  .0439 
(- 2.28) 
KNOWCANCER  4.303 
(6.01) 




















-  0.0049 
(- 5.61) 











-  0.0052 
(- 5.66) 





Note: The numbers in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-ratios for 
the null hypothesis of  no association. 
Coefficient has been scaled by 100 (i.e., reported  = estimated  x  100). 
bCoefficient  has been scaled by 10,OOO. 
Table 12.3  Hedonic Wage Models: Male Sample with Alternative 
Environmental Quality  Measures 
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lbble 12.3 (continued) 
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( -  4.40) 
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( -  4.86) 
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(- 4.16) 
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(- 1.313) 
-  .289 
( -  0.599) 
-  .0067 
(-5.813) 
-  0.032 




-  .00284 
-  0.162 
(- 4.08) 
-  0.029 
(- 0.74) 
-0.200 
( -  4.96) 
-  0.155 
(-3.67) 
-  0.175 
(- 4.23) 
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(- 1.301) 
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(-0.170) 
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(- 5.933) 






( -  4.05) 






-  0.172 
(-4.16) 
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-  .0050 
(-4.401) 





-  .00181 
Note: The numbers in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are the t-ratios for 
the null hypothesis of  no association. 
Coefficient has been scaled by 100 (i.e., reported  = estimated  x  100). 
bCoefficient  has been scaled by 10,OOO. 
regarded as a plausible framework for measuring the implicit valuation of 
job risk or the marginal willingness to pay for reductions in air pollution. 
Equally important, these results indicate that it is possible to estimate 
separate,  statistically  significant  effects  on  real  wages  for  different 
sources of risk-accidents  on the job, health risks that arise from expo- 
sure to air pollution, and the long-latency health risks associated with ex- 376  V. Kerry SmitWCarol C. S. Gilbert 
posure to carcinogens in the workplace. It appears that the statistical sig- 
nificance and direction of these effects are stable for variations in sample 
composition (see Smith 1983). Consequently, at a general level these re- 
sults confirm the earlier work of Hoch (1974), Rosen (1979), and Cropper 
and Arriaga-Salinas (1980). 
What has not been undertaken, to date, is the development of a com- 
parison of the implied valuations of risk changes. Unfortunately, we can- 
not include in this comparison the long-latency risks. Our index of car- 
cinogenic exposures  is  based  on  a  limited  survey of  experience with 
carcinogens in the workplace. The estimated exposures were extrapolated 
for each two-digit SIC code to the industry level. They do not take ac- 
count of control methods that may be in place in each industry and should 
be treated as a crude measure of potential exposure, scaled by the estimated 
working hours from the BLS injury rate data. Given the limitations in the 
index, we have interpreted it as a proxy variable to account for this factor 
and not attempted to  use it as an  estimate of exposure risk. Consequently, 
in what follows we develop and compare the estimates of  the willingness 
to pay for risk reductions implied by these models for two of the three 
sources of risk. 
12.4.2  The Estimated Valuation of  Risk Reductions 
We have estimated two implicit valuations for risk changes from the he- 
donic wage models.  The first follows directly from conventional  prac- 
tices. As we noted in section 12.2 above, the valuation estimates for “sta- 
tistical lives” are simply transformations to the wage premiums required 
for small increments in the risk of fatal accidents. Rather than scale these 
estimates to correspond to the value implied by reducing the expected 
number of fatalities by one, we have simply reported the estimated mar- 
ginal valuations for an incremental reduction in risk. 
The second is derived by adapting an ingenious proposal by  Portney 
(1981) to the wage-hedonic framework. Portney’s suggestion was made 
using a hedonic property value model but is equally relevant for a wage 
model. It maintains that individuals seek to avoid exposure to air pollu- 
tion because they recognize that such exposure increases mortality risks. 
Consequently, if we assume that individuals “know” the relationship be- 
tween air pollution exposure and this increased risk, we can infer an im- 
plicit valuation for risk reductions using the wage premiums required to 
accept increased pollution. 
For our particular  application,  both risk valuation estimates require 
some specific adjustments to the estimated parameters.  The first valu- 
ation relates to the wage premiums for increased risk of fatal accidents, 
while the risk measure used in our hedonic wage model is for all acci- 377  Valuation of Environmental  Risks Using Hedonic Wage Models 
dents.20  Consequently we must estimate the share of total accidents that 
are fatal. Following Viscusi (1978b) we  maintain that fatalities are ap- 
proximately .4 percent of all accidents. Our wage measure is the hourly 
rate. To convert our valuation estimate to  an annual willingness to  pay, we 
assume 2,000 hours are worked per year. Thus, the estimated marginal 
willingness to pay for a risk reduction is assumed to  correspond to the ac- 
ceptance wage in annual terms and is calculated by rescaling the estimated 
parameter for our risk measure to reflect the units of measure and propor- 
tion of  fatal accidents. This coefficient is then multiplied by the relevant 
(depending on the sample) average hourly wage and by 2,000. Since our 
model corresponds to wages in 1978, the result is adjusted by the Consumer 
Price Index to provide the 1982 estimates of implicit marginal valuations 
of risk changes. The resulting estimate for our basic model is reported in 
the first column and row of table 12.4. 
To translate the wage premium for incremental changes in TSP to a 
valuation of risk, we must postulate the mortality risk-TSP  relationship 
that is assumed to be recognized by our sample respondents. This litera- 
ture is fraught with problems and exhibits a diverse array of estimates (for 
discussion see Gerking and Schulze (1981),  and Freeman (1982).  Fortu- 
nately, as part of the benefit analysis conducted for its review of  the cur- 
rent primary standard for particulate matter, the EPA sponsored research 
that attempted to provide consensus estimates of the total mortality risk- 
TSP relationship based on  both micro- and macroepidemiological studies. 
We  have selected three values,  including the consensus point  estimate 
from the macroepidemiological studies, for our analysis. The range of es- 
timates was from 0 to .471 as the impact of a change of one microgram per 
cubic meter in TSP (measured as the annual geometric mean) on the total 
mortality rate (deaths per 100,OOO).  Our three estimates span the range of 
possible impacts of particulates on mortality. Each has been considered in 
the calculations including what was judged to be the “best” estimate of 
.171 (see MathTech 1983, pp. 4-55-4-56).  Using these estimates together 
with the wage premiums for increments to TSP we can impute values for 
fatality  risks  associated  with  air  pollution  exposures (i.e.,  aw/dp  = 
(aw/dTSP)/(dp/dTSP),  where /3  = risk of death due to air pollution expo- 
sure). This scaling together with the use of the average hourly wage and as- 
sumption of  2,000 hours worked yields estimates for the implicit annual 
valuation of this risk. They are reported in 1982 dollars for the basic model in 
the second column (I) for the smallest impact, the intermediate value (11) 
in the third column, and the highest value (111) in the fourth. All estimates 
are for 1 x  increments in risk. 
20. The BLS accident rate measure was scaled to a rate per hundred workers. Hence the 
parameter estimates must be adjusted to reflect this scaling. 378  V.  Kerry Smith/Carol C. S. Gilbert 
Table U.4  Estimated Marginal Valuations for Risk Reductions 
Source of Risk 
Exposure to Air Pollution‘ 
Model  Workplace  I  I1  I11 
Basic model 
Comparable treatment of 
fatal + nonfatal 
accidents 
Proportional reduction in 
marginal valuation to 




Full sample, unrestrictedd 
Full sample, excluding air 
Male sample, unrestricted 
Expansions in air pollutants 
treated 
SO1 measured as annual 
arithmetic mean (A) 
SO2  measured as annual 
arithmetic mean of  daily 
highs (B) 
arithmetic mean of daily 
lows (C) 
pollution 
SOl measured as annual 
52.70  941.82  94.18  34.19 








2,419.45  241.95  51.36 
508.22  50.82  18.45 
-  -  - 
871.67  87.17  31.92 
1,892.3  1  189.23  68.70 
1,308.40  130.84  47.50 
2,173.45  217.35  78.91 
Note: These estimates are in  1982 dollars and were converted from 1978 dollars using 
the Consumer Price Index for December 1982. 
aThese estimates of  the  marginal willingness to pay  for  risk reduction relate  to the 
increased risk of mortality based on  exposure to total suspended particulates. I assumes 
a marginal effect of  .017, I1 an effect of  ,171, and I11 an effect of  ,471. 
a contingent valuation survey of individuals’ willingness to pay for air quality im- 
provements, Brookshire et al. 1979 asked respondents to allocate their total willingness 
to pay among aesthetic and health motivations. Their results indicated that 30 percent 
of the total willingness to pay was attributed to aesthetic motives. This estimate maintains 
that the same proportion can be applied to the willingness-to-pay estimates from the 
wage model. 
CThese  estimates utilize the average wage for males of  $7.22 rather than the overall 
sample average wage rate of $6.18. 
the semilog specification of  the hedonic wage model, the use of  the log of  the real 
wage is equivalent to a specification using the log of the nominal wage with the log of 
the cost of living as a determinant of wages whose coefficient is restricted to unity. The 
unrestricted  form uses nominal wages and allows the parameter for the cost-of-living 
variable to be freely estimated. 379  Valuation of Environmental Risks Using Hedonic Wage Models 
Clearly these marginal valuations are quite different. The implicit valu- 
ation due to air pollution ranges from a value nearly twenty times to one 
that is about 60 percent of that associated with fatal accidents in the work- 
place. Since it might be argued that these estimates reflect other motives 
for valuing air quality, we have considered a variety of adjustments to  this 
estimate. 
The second row in the table uses the only available estimate of the por- 
tion of household’s valuation of air quality due to health and aesthetics to 
adjust implicit risk valuation as a result of exposures to air pollution. The 
highest valuation (I) remains well outside the scope that might be attributed 
to random variation, while the intermediate case could well be considered 
within the range of estimates for risk valuations due to job risks. However, it 
is also fair to note that further adjustments are clearly warranted. Even 
after adjustment for aesthetics, this approach to valuation attributes all 
the wage premiums to mortality risk reductions.  The wage differential 
may also reflect morbidity effects. Finally, within a simple general equilib- 
rium description of household adjustment in the property and labor mar- 
kets (i.e., selecting site amenities by changing location), we might also ex- 
pect  that  these  estimates  of  willingness  to  pay  for  air  quality 
improvements  would  reflect  the  implications  of  these changes  for all 
household members. 
We have attempted two further adjustments to reflect these two consid- 
erations. Freeman’s (1982) recent analysis of the benefits with the air qual- 
ity improvements from 1970 to 1978 indicated that approximately 18 per- 
cent of the total benefits arose from morbidity effects. Using either this 
adjustment or the assumption of a three-person household, we can narrow 
the discrepancy between the valuation implied by the intermediate morta- 
lity/particulate association. For example, assuming the valuation is equal 
for all household members is below the workplace risks (i.e.,  $31.39 ver- 
sus $52.50). Adjustment for morbidity effects alone reduces the valuation 
to $77.23. This is not true for either of  the extreme assumptions concern- 
ing mortality/particulate  associations. In both cases, these adjustments 
and the implicit valuations remain substantially different. In case I, they 
remain substantially greater than the implicit valuation of workplace risk, 
while in case I11 they become much smaller. These distinctions serve to 
highlight the importance of the individual’s perception of the relationship 
between exposure to particulate matter and the associated risk of death. 
The balance of  the table repeats the calculations presented in the first 
row with a variety of alternative model or sample specifications  including: 
(a)  confining the sample to males (as frequently has been the case in the lit- 
erature on valuing job risks); (b) changing the treatment of the local cost- 
of-living variable; (c) excluding air pollution completely; and (d)  expand- 
ing the  types of  pollutants  included  in the  model to include  another 380  V.  Kerry SmitWCarol C.  S.  Gilbert 
pollutant-sulphur  dioxide. The complete results for the wage models as- 
sociated with the last of these variations are also reported in tables  12.2 
and 12.3. The equation designations-A,  B, and C-correspond  to the 
various measures of sulphur dioxide identified in table 12.4. 
These results clearly indicate that the implicit value of  risk associated 
with air pollution exposure is sensitive to model specification, while that 
due to job fatalities is not. However, these variations do not serve to nar- 
row greatly the discrepancy in marginal valuations of risk associated with 
these two sources. Accordingly, if  we accept the theoretical premises of 
the hedonic model itself, these results provide indirect and tentative sup- 
port for the need to distinguish estimates of the willingness to  pay for risk 
based on the types of risk and of the effects involved. At the same time, 
they also indicate the significant limitations of the hedonic wage model as 
a method for precisely estimating distinct valuations for risk reductions 
from different sources. 
12.5  Implications 
There is growing evidence that the hedonic wage model can provide an 
empirical basis for isolating the site and job characteristics that influence 
equilibrium wage rates. Our analysis with a large microdata set and more 
extensive definitions for site characteristics is also clearly consistent with 
this conclusion. Equally important, it provides some evidence that indi- 
cates individuals may well value comparable risk changes differently. That 
is, we have considered risk increments that are of equivalent size and lead 
to the same ultimate outcome (a fatality). Of course the initial probabil- 
ities of  the fatality and the avenues available for adjustment can be ex- 
pected to be different in these two cases. 
It should also be acknowledged that access to information and the cor- 
responding perception of these risks are likely to be different in these 
cases. Work-related  risks are more tangible.  Many union contracts re- 
quire not only wage adjustments to reflect such hazards, but also dissemi- 
nate information on the risks. By contrast, the extent of  general knowl- 
edge  of  the  risks  of  exposure  to air  pollution,  especially pollution 
associated with one particular pollutant, is much more limited. Indeed, 
the available technical information of the health risk exhibits considerable 
diversity of  opinion on the severity of the risks. It would therefore not be 
too surprising to find that these estimates were subject to large errors. 
Nonetheless, to attribute all of the difference between these estimates of 
individual willingness to pay for risk to random error requires that we re- 
gard the effects of  air pollution on wages as essentially noninformative. 
This is certainly not the position that has been taken in benefit cost analy- 
ses of air quality changes. Consequently, we must attempt to explain the 381  Valuation of Environmental Risks Using Hedonic Wage Models 
discrepancy. One of the most important explanations is the role of percep- 
tions in the valuation of risk changes. Clearly the sensitivity of the implicit 
valuation of  risk derived from the wage-risk relationships illustrates the 
importance of this explanation. 
In his discussion of the failure of the expected utility model as a descrip- 
tion of individual behavior under uncertainty, Schoemaker (1982) identi- 
fies five aspects of  decision making that have been established from psy- 
chological research. They deal with limitations in the simple economic 
description of individual choice, noting that: (1) most decisions are made 
by decomposing the problem involved and using relative comparisons; (2) 
the strategies used for decisions vary with the complexity of the task to be 
undertaken; (3) choices on one problem are often made in isolation from 
other decisions; (4) selections involving gains and losses are made with in- 
dividual reference points; and (5) subjective perceptions of  probabilities 
may not relate linearly to objective estimates. 
While these are all interesting and potentially important reasons for 
amending economic models of individual behavior, they have been de- 
rived largely in frameworks that are purely experimental and therefore 
outside the domain of actual economic choices. 
In order to  advance our understanding of individual behavior under un- 
certainty and the role of perceptions for it, research must be directed to 
how individuals conceive of risks that are part of their everyday economic 
choices. Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein’s (1979) work began in inquiry 
in this direction, but did not go far enough. Research must examine tangi- 
ble choices involving risk, how they would be (and are) made, the infor- 
mation acquired to judge risk, and how prior beliefs are changed with the 
availability of  new information.  In conducting such research there is an 
inevitable trade-off between the controlled, but unrealistic, environment 
of  the laboratory versus the realistic, but hypothetical, setting of survey 
research. For real-world economic choices we  see little alternative to the 
survey approach. However, such surveys must be paired with behavioral 
models where actual choices can be observed and used to gain insight into 
individuals’ trade-offs. For example, surveys can attempt to elicit wage- 
acceptance functions for job risk and investigate how they change with 
new information. These responses could be compared with respondents’ 
actual choices and with the results derived from empirically estimated he- 
donic wage models. 
Comparative analyses of the perceptions of environmental risks versus 
other types of risks also might serve to identify the factors that influence 
individuals’ understanding of these risks and the sources used for infor- 
mation on them. 
One of  the most important distinctions between these research efforts 
and those undertaken  in psychology is a willingness to use behavioral 
models in conjunction with survey research to frame the research ques- 382  V.  Keny SmitWCarol C. S. Gilbert 
tions and analyze the findings. This should not be misconstrued as a call 
for blind acceptance of  the current economic framework for describing 
individual behavior under uncertainty. Rather, it is a suggestion that we 
need not dispense with it entirely. Indeed, there appears to  be a framework 
that is capable of  explaining contradictions to the expected utility frame- 
work, but requires empirical research to  facilitate our understanding of its 
implications. That is, our theoretical analysis suggests that if, following 
Cook and Graham, the effects at risk cannot simply be converted into 
equivalent income streams, state-dependent utility functions may be the 
most appropriate way of modeling individuals’ valuation of risk changes. 
Within these models, differences in the willingness to pay for comparable 
risk  changes can be expected.  This poses significant problems  for the 
transfer of willingness-to-pay  estimates for one type of risk change to  value a 
comparable change in another. 
Finally, our analysis also suggests that the wage-hedonic framework 
based on secondary data cannot be regarded as a precise instrument for 
estimating the value of risk changes. It is simply incompatible with the de- 
gree of  resolution and detail expected in environmental risk assessment. 
This incompatibility poses significant problems for the economic valu- 
ation of the estimates of risk changes available from the current structure 
of risk assessment practices in environmental policy-making. 
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COmmeIlt  T. H. Tietenberg 
Risk management used to be a private affair. In these simpler times con- 
sumers were seen as holding producers and sellers accountable by refusing 
to  purchase excessively risky products, while employees were seen as hold- 
ing employers accountable by demanding higher wages in risky occupa- 
tions. In the face of these market pressures producers and employers were 
expected to reduce their risk to acceptable levels or be driven out of busi- 
ness while consumers and workers were expected to insure against any re- 
maining risk. Courts provided a vehicle for risk bearers to exert pressure 
on third-party risk creators (those with whom they held no contractual re- 
lationship and, therefore, were immune from direct market pressures). 
Risk management is no longer a private affair. As a result of growth in 
the magnitude and complexity of risks, the government has become more 
heavily involved in the process of identifying and controlling these risks. 
Consumers and employees are increasingly seen as ill informed, particu- 
larly  concerning  those  risks involving long  latency periods.  Even the 
courts are seen as impotent in dealing with disputes where the number of 
parties is large, such as in air pollution cases, or where the cause-and-effect 
relationship between a particular activity, such as producing pesticides, 
and the onset of cancer some thirty years later is hard to establish. 
This transformation  in public  sector responsibilities has triggered  a 
concurrent quantum increase in the need for analytical support both to 
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define an acceptable level of risk and to choose the most desirable ways of 
achieving it. Are the analytical concepts, the empirical methods, and the 
available data equal to the task? 
Purpose 
The Smith-Gilbert chapter attempts to provide a partial answer to this 
question by focusing on how reliably one kind of analytical technique (the 
hedonic wage model) values changes in one kind of risk (environmentally 
induced fatalities). They begin by analyzing the kinds of demands placed 
on the analysis by the policy process, proceed by developing a theoretical 
model to value state-dependent  risks,  continue by estimating a model 
based on a sample of 16,199 individuals, and conclude by computing al- 
ternative risk valuations based on  this model for the purpose of evaluating 
the reliability of the state of the art. 
Principal Conclusions 
In their own words the principal conclusions of the authors are: 
it is possible to estimate separate, statistically significant effects on real 
wages for different sources of risk-accidents  on the job, health risks 
that arise from exposure to air pollution, and the long-latency health 
risks associated with exposure to carcinogens in the workplace. It ap- 
pears that the statistical significance and direction of these effects are 
stable for variations in sample composition. (P. 375-76) 
the implicit value of risk associated with air pollution exposure is sensi- 
tive  to model  specification, while that  due to job fatalities  is  not. 
(P. 380) 
these results provide indirect and tentative support for the need to dis- 
tinguish estimates of the willingness to  pay for risk based on the types of 
risk and of the effects involved. (P. 380) 
the wage-hedonic framework based on secondary data cannot be re- 
garded as a precise instrument for estimating the value of risk changes. 
It is simply incompatible with the degree of resolution and detail expected 
in environmental risk assessment. This incompatibility imposes signifi- 
cant problems  for the economic valuation  of  the estimates of  risk 
changes available from the current structure of  risk assessment prac- 
tices in environmental policy-making. (P. 382) 
A Critique 
I should say at  the outset that I think this is an excellent chapter and, al- 
though I am by nature an optimist, I have no disagreement with its rather 
pessimistic conclusions. Indeed the thrust of my remarks will be to rein- 387  Valuation of Environmental Risks Using Hedonic Wage Models 
force them. My differences with the authors will be more a question of de- 
gree than direction. 
The Theoretical Model 
Perhaps my strongest difference with the authors is the degree of faith 
they seem to  have in the wage model as a method of valuing risks. They at- 
tribute most of the difficulties in interpreting  and using the results for 
policy purposes to the lack of  sufficiently rich data, whereas I believe the 
wage model itself has significant inherent limitations that could not com- 
pletely be overcome even with the best data we could reasonably expect to 
derive from actual occupational situations. 
At the most general level a basic inconsistency exists between the need 
to derive these valuations and the use of wage differentials as the means 
for derivation. The need for these estimates by the public sector has been 
driven  by the conviction  that  markets do not  adequately  compensate 
workers for risk (Le., that wages do not adequately reflect risk). This im- 
plies that actual wage valuations of  risk will be biased (upward if  the 
workers are unrealistically fearful or downward if they are unaware of the 
very real risks they face). 
One possible answer to this problem is that those who lack knowledge 
are only a subset of  workers, and the ill-perceived risks are only a subset 
of the risks workers face. With an appropriate knowledge variable the 
valuations of the most clearly perceived risks by the most informed work- 
ers could  be extracted  and applied  to other cases.  The Smith-Gilbert 
knowledge variable is certainly a step in the right direction, but, as I am 
sure the authors would readily admit, it is quite crude. This is neither the 
time nor the place to go into detail on information and uncertainty, but in 
brief the available empirical evidence seems to cast doubt on the ability of 
people to process information on low-probability, high-loss events, even 
when the information is available (see Schoemaker 1982, p. 544). Further- 
more, the authors themselves cast doubt on the transferability of one set 
of risk valuations to a different set of circumstances. 
In my opinion the problems with using the wage model to value risk are 
greater when it is used to value general environmental risks (such as expo- 
sure to ambient air pollution), than when it is used to  value specific  occu- 
pational risks. The compensation for occupational risk, to the extent it 
takes place in the market at all, will certainly take place in the labor mar- 
ket. The case is less clear for general environmental risks. 
For general environmental risks there are other markets in which com- 
pensation can occur. Indeed the empirical literature suggests a consider- 
able sensitivity of property values to pollution levels. If these results are 
valid, are victims receiving complete compensation in both property and 
labor markets (meaning they are overcompensated in total) or do  they de- 388  V.  Kerry SmitWCarol C. S. Gilbert 
rive only partial compensation in each market? If the latter, then labor 
markets provide only a partial picture of risk valuation for general envi- 
ronmental risks. In any case it is not obvious that labor markets fully com- 
pensate for general environmental risks. 
My final concern with using the wage model relates to the existence of 
nonwage forms of payment such as workmen’s compensation. The exis- 
tence of workmen’s compensation triggers two rather different problems. 
First, when a workmen’s compensation system exists, more dangerous in- 
dustries may face higher compensation costs, but these will be borne as 
premiums paid into the system, not as higher wages. Therefore, wages will 
not  reflect  actual  risk,  though  total  compensation,  correctly  defined, 
would. 
The second problem is with a possible bias introduced by workmen’s 
compensation. Some type of accidents have a higher probability of cover- 
age under workmen’s compensation than others. For example, health ef- 
fects with a long latency period and those for which the industrial cause is 
not obvious have a lower likelihood  of  coverage. In a perfect  market 
wages would reflect the latter (lower-coverage) risk more accurately than 
the  former  (higher-coverage) risk.  Unfortunately, however, the lower- 
coverage risks are precisely those about which the workers probably have 
the least information and, therefore, are precisely those risks where wage 
differentials are least likely to  capture the “fully informed” risk premium. 
The Data 
The authors  decry the lack of useful data, and I agree with their analysis 
of the situation. However, I want to add yet another concern about the 
kind of data that analysts are currently forced to use. 
The Smith-Gilbert equations are based on 16,199 observations, but not 
all variables have that many individual observations. Many of the vari- 
ables are not measured relative to the individual; they are measured rela- 
tive to an occupation, an industry, or an SMSA. For these variables the 
measured intraoccupation, intraindustry or intra-SMSA variance is zero. 
The only measured variance occurs among occupations, industries, and 
SMSAs. Unfortunately  all of the risk variables-the  primary focus of 
their paper-fall  within this category. 
This would not be a problem if all workers w5thin each of these catego- 
ries faced the same risk, but clearly they do not. To take one example, all 
workers in a city do not face the same pollution level. Their exposure de- 
pends on where they live and work. Pollution levels are high in certain 
parts of the city and low in other (typically less-congested) parts. 
This creates an errors-in-variables problem that has two dimensions. 
First, compared to a measure of actual exposure to risk, these measure- 
ments rob us of a significant amount of potentially information-rich vari- 389  Valuation of Environmental Risks Using Hedonic Wage Models 
ance. An intuitive feel for the importance of this point can be gained by 
considering an extreme, but nontheless revealing, example. Suppose that 
the average pollution levels in all cities were the same, although each city 
had a considerable variance in pollution levels within its boundaries. Sup- 
pose further that residents placed a high value on pollution reduction; 
therefore, those who were most exposed demanded a significant wage pre- 
mium. In this case the regression model would find no relationship be- 
tween wages and pollution level whereas, in fact, a significant relationship 
exists. The type of measurement of exposure to risk mandated by current 
data availability fails to capture a significant amount of  the interesting 
variance. It also enhances the unpleasant prospect that these proxies may 
be picking up other determinants of wages that are correlated with the 
cross-industry, -occupation, or -SMSA variance but have no direct bear- 
ing on risk. 
The second point to be made about this missing variance is that it ap- 
plies to some, but not all, of the variables. This differential treatment of 
variables creates the potential for bias. To illustrate the point consider, as 
an example, the air pollution variable that varies only among SMSAs in 
the Smith-Gilbert analysis. All workers within an SMSA have the same 
measured value of air pollution, though in fact they may experience  very 
different levels. It is probably the case that there is a correlation between 
the true (unobserved) value of within-city air pollution exposure and other 
variables in the model for which individual observations are available. 
The existing empirical air pollution literature (see, for example, Asch and 
Seneca 1978) suggests that such a correlation exists with race (blacks typi- 
cally have higher exposures) and with education levels (the least educated 
tend to experience the highest exposure). If this is the case, some of the 
variance that would have been explained by the risk variables, had they 
been correctly measured, is mistakenly attributed to these correlated var- 
iables. Thus the coefficients on the risk variables may tend to be biased. 
Applying the Data 
The Smith-Gilbert chapter provides both theoretical and empirical rea- 
sons for believing that the value of lowering the probability of death from 
an environmental risk depends on the types of risk. Though this result ac- 
cords well with common sense (the intensity and duration of pain as a fac- 
tor, for example), it flies in the face of much common practice. It is easier, 
and of even more importance quicker, to transfer calculations among situ- 
ations involving risks with some similar attributes than it is to derive sepa- 
rate estimates. Yet until we are able to obtain some firmly established set 
of propositions on how risk valuations vary systematically with identifi- 
able risk attributes, separate estimates cannot be avoided if the valuations 
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Suggestions for Future Research 
Improving the Data 
The Smith-Gilbert chapter is helpful in calling our attention to limita- 
tions in the available data. Using their analysis and that in the preceding 
sections of this chapter it is possible to begin setting an agenda for future 
data collection efforts. 
Perhaps one of the more intriguing avenues for further research comes 
out of the Smith-Gilbert finding that risks involving similar probabilities 
of fatality are valued differently by workers. This finding introduces a sig- 
nificant difficulty into risk management  practices because separate risk 
valuations are required for each unique risk. 
This difficulty could be reduced, however, if we could find identifiable 
attributes of  risk that have a common valuation across various types of 
risk. In this framework, differences in risk valuations would arise from 
different bundles of common-valued attributes rather than from different 
valuations of the attributes themselves. Once the attributes and their val- 
ues were determined, risk assessment would be rescued from the need for 
a unique empirical study for every conceivable kind of risk. To establish 
whether common-valued attributes can be identified and valued, a richer 
set of data is needed. Specifically attribute variables need to be included in 
the set of risk measures, not merely exposure variables. These could in- 
clude, for example, the voluntariness of the risk, the potential intensity 
and duration of pain, other effects on the quality of life, and so forth. 
Other, more immediate, steps are possible. Great strides could be un- 
dertaken if true individual risk measures were available for workers. The 
current use of grouped or common-risk measures opens the door to biased 
risk evaluation. Although it is not clear how much bias exists in the cur- 
rent estimates, the fact that we do not know is unsettling. 
The availability of information on risk to workers is probably another 
important factor about which we need better measurements. Current var- 
iables that control for this are obviously crude. It would not be difficult to 
design better variables; the problem is going to be collecting this informa- 
tion from the same sample of workers as wage rate information is collect- 
ed. The responsibilities for collecting wage rate information and for man- 
aging worker risk do not reside in the same organization. 
Better Use of Existing Data 
Though it is obviously easier to construct data wish lists than to con- 
front the task of doing more with what we have, I do have a few modest 
suggestions. These concern developing a better understanding of the so- 
cioeconomic determinants of risk valuation and the role of unions in sup- 
plying information. 391  Valuation of Environmental  Risks Using Hedonic Wage Models 
One question of interest concerns whether risk valuation varies among 
socioeconomic groups. The  current model estimated by Smith and Gilbert 
controls for race and education, but presents no evidence on the possibil- 
ity of  interactions.  It would be a simple matter to include interaction 
terms for education and risk as well as for race and risk as a point of de- 
parture. One could develop any number of scenarios that would lead one 
to expect differences to arise (e.g., information and income effects), but it 
remains an empirical question whether these differences are of sufficient 
magnitude to deserve special emphasis. 
The Smith-Gilbert data set includes a binary variable that states whether 
the worker is a member of a union. Given their predisposition to believe 
that unions affect the amount of  information  available, an interaction 
variable constructed by multiplying union membership by measures of oc- 
cupational risk would seem appropriate.  It might further be possible to 
separate those unions that tend to make risk information available to their 
workers from those that do not. 
Concluding Comments 
This is a balanced and perceptive chapter that has improved our knowl- 
edge of the state of the art. The main message is a negative one-we  have a 
long way to go. Yet this message should not obscure another, equally im- 
portant, message-we  have come a long way. 
Two aspects of the empirical work in particular suggest that this line of 
research is worth pursuing. With the exception of  the air pollution vari- 
ables  the  results  are stable across  model  specifications. Furthermore, 
again with the exception of  one air pollution variable (SO,), there is a re- 
markable agreement between those signs suggested by theory and those 
signs estimated from the data. Though I have qualms about the bias of the 
estimated coefficients, it does appear that the general approach has validity. 
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